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Abstract 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are innovative poverty intervention programs 
that have been adapted and adopted in dozens of countries around the world. The 
effectiveness of the programs in the short-term have been established by a number 
of studies, but they have only recently been around long enough to begin to observe 
whether they indeed disrupt the inter-generational poverty cycle as claimed. The 
expected long-term effects are central to the appeal of CCT programs. This 
empirical study examines the data to determine whether there is evidence that the 
long-term effects are as apparent as the short-term effects in one of the original 
adopters, Brazil. The analysis examines municipal level government data using OLS 
regression and finds evidence that CCTs raised 8th grade graduation rates and 
lowered unemployment and birthrates. The conclusion is that, at least in Brazil, 
CCTs seem to be making headway in changing conditions that often lead to inter-
generational poverty cycles.  
Keywords: conditional cash transfers (CCTs), Brazil, poverty alleviation, 
development, poverty cycle 
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Resumen 
Las Transferencias Monetarias Condicionadas (CCT) son programas innovadores de 
intervención contra la pobreza que se han adaptado y adoptado en decenas de países 
de todo el mundo. Varios estudios han establecido la eficacia de los programas a 
corto plazo, pero solo recientemente han existido tiempo suficiente como para 
comenzar a observar si realmente perturban el ciclo de pobreza intergeneracional tal 
como se afirma. Los efectos esperados a largo plazo son centrales para el atracción 
de los programas de CCT. Este estudio empírico examina los datos para determinar 
si hay evidencia de que los efectos a largo plazo son tan evidentes como los efectos 
a corto plazo en uno de los adoptantes originales, Brasil. El análisis examina los 
datos del gobierno a nivel municipal, utilizando la regresión MCO y encuentra 
evidencia de que los CCT elevaron las tasas de graduación del octavo grado y 
redujeron el desempleo y la tasa de fecundidad. La conclusión es que, al menos en 
Brasil, las CCT parecen estar avanzando las condiciones que a menudo conducen a 
ciclos de pobreza intergeneracionales.  
Palabras clave: transferencias monetarias condicionadas, Brasil, reducción de la 
pobreza, desarrollo, ciclo de la pobreza
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n the late 90s, both Mexico and Brazil independently began 
building domestic poverty alleviation programs that would soon 
grab the attention of people interested in development and poverty, 
from policymakers to non-profits, to academics. There were two key ideas 
behind these programs. The first was to simply give poor families cash 
transfers rather than in-kind transfers. This allows each recipient household 
to use the cash according to their needs, at face value, rather than being 
offered something they do not need or having to exchange commodities for a 
fraction of their true value to acquire more useful goods (Fiszbein & Schady, 
2009). 
 The second key element of these plans was to use the cash transfers to 
induce long-term investment in human capital that might help break inter-
generational poverty cycles. Poor families would have to enroll their 
children in school and ensure their attendance. They would also have to 
ensure that children were meeting minimum health and growth trajectories. 
Families that failed to meet these conditions would not receive the cash 
transfers. Thus, the children of poor families would have a better chance of 
breaking out of poverty as the program gave them the tools they needed to 
secure better employment and avoid many of the pitfalls that often entrap the 
poor.  
 Brazil’s Bolsa Família program received a large boost in 2003 when 
President Lula consolidated several smaller programs and increased the 
scope and funding for the newly unified conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
program. It took time to scale up, but today Bolsa Família reaches more than 
11 million households, or over 40 million people. Benefits can range up to 
R$200 per month, depending on the number of qualifying children in the 
household and household income. The families who are eligible to enroll in 
the program are the very poor, with average household incomes of about 
R$243 per month (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). So Bolsa Família represents a 
huge proportion of monthly income for some families. However, the 
program is surprisingly inexpensive. Bolsa Família reportedly accounts for 
only about 0.3% of GDP (Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania, 2010; 
Schultz, 1997).  
Nevertheless, the short-term impact of Bolsa Família has been well-
established. Bolsa Família and other CCTs significantly reduce under-5 
I 
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mortality from malnutrition (McCrary & Royer, 2011), increase the use of 
preventative health services (Sen, 1999), improve overall mortality figures 
(World Bank, 2012) and increase school enrollment (Behrman, 1996; 
Rasella, Aquino, Santos, Paes-Sousa & Barreto, 2013). The successes of 
CCT programs in Brazil and elsewhere have sparked the interests and hopes 
of policymakers in many more countries. The World Bank reports that at 
least thirty countries now have some form of CCT program (Fiszbein & 
Schady, 2009). 
While these short-term results look promising, and indeed have already 
had a significant impact on immediate poverty concerns, the programs are 
new enough that it has been difficult to observe whether the short-term 
results also produce long-term changes. Myriad studies have reported on the 
immediate poverty alleviation outcomes, which represent the first objective 
of the program. This paper is a first look at some of the long-term effects we 
might expect to see at the societal level. It uses data on how thoroughly 
Bolsa Família was implemented at the municipal level to get some leverage 
on long-term impacts and making progress towards disrupting inter-
generational poverty cycles. It does this by looking for tell-tale indicators 
such as changes in fertility rates which often indicates improved educational 
outcomes and empowerment for girls and women; educational achievement, 
which goes beyond simple enrollment to examine changes in earning 
potential; and unemployment, a measure of changing labor markets and 
opportunities available to low-income households.  
 
Objectives of CCTs 
 
The two-pronged approach of Bolsa Família is appealing to many 
policymakers. With the large number of poor Brazilians, the government 
must concern itself with their welfare for both political and humanitarian 
reasons. Poverty is rampant, and hunger and malnutrition are not uncommon 
for many Brazilians. Second, it is hoped that the program will help break the 
inter-generational poverty cycle (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). Not only are 
millions of Brazilians mired in the mud pit of poverty, their children are 
unlikely to be any better off. The opportunities that poverty takes away from 
children of poor families will cost them education, income and fulfillment 
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for the rest of their lives. Combining the two facets of poverty alleviation 
into a single program is one of the things that makes CCTs appealing to so 
many people and governments. 
Bolsa Família helps address immediate needs by providing qualifying 
families with income supplements. The appeal of cash transfers, as opposed 
to in-kind transfers for example, is the gain in efficiency. Tax payers and 
politicians often like the control that in-kind transfers give them, since they 
can control how much, and what kinds of commodities program recipients 
are receiving. This, presumably, gives them confidence that recipients are 
not squandering tax dollars on frivolous pursuits or purchasing luxuries that 
tax payers themselves do not have. The problem, though, is that in-kind 
transfers are less efficient than cash transfers. They require greater 
government oversight to specify the types and quantities of commodities that 
the recipients receive, and to try and prevent recipients from exchanging the 
commodities the program gives them for non-essential items. 
Cash transfer programs eliminate the paternalism inherent to in-kind 
transfers. They require less government oversight because program 
facilitators need only verify that conditions are being met and that cash is 
being deposited into beneficiaries’ bank accounts. Recipients are free to 
select the types and quantities of commodities or services that will benefit 
them most. Some recipients, for example, may have the ability to grow a 
large garden, but an in-kind transfer provides them with produce and takes 
away their incentive to optimize their garden plot. The cash transfer allows 
them to use part of the transfer to buy seed and fertilizer to grow the produce 
they need, and still leave some left over. They can choose to shop carefully, 
buying the commodities they need at the best possible price, and cutting out 
commodities that they do not need in order to maximize their benefit. This 
serves to make the program more impactful. 
Moreover, we may see impacts from education-based conditions in other 
areas too. For example, a strong body of literature has shown robust 
correlations between female education and fertility rates, with good reason 
to believe that greater education leads to lower fecundity (McCrary & Royer, 
2011; Schultz, 1997). Female education gives women better tools for family 
planning, addressing health and, perhaps, asserting a stronger role in their 
relationships. Sen (1999) demonstrated that increasing female education 
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pays big dividends in child mortality rates. Increasing female education also 
opens opportunities for women to enter the workforce, which also reduces 
fecundity rates (World Bank, 2012). We could not observe whether this was 
occurring as a result of the Bolsa Família program until the first generation 
of students who were incentivized to remain in school eventually began 
having children of their own. At that point, the additional time spent in 
school may lead those women to have fewer children.  
Bolsa Família’s conditions also compel families to invest in health. 
Children and pregnant or lactating mothers are required to attend regular 
medical checkups, receive standard vaccinations and be on target with 
healthy growth trajectories, a common indicator of malnutrition. Brazil’s 
Family Health Program means that there is no fees associated with medical 
visits, but before the program, many people, especially the poor, did not 
always receive the medical care they needed for long-term health. For some, 
the inconvenience of distant clinics deterred them from receiving regular 
medical attention. For others, it may simply have been a matter of priorities. 
Consequently, although it is improving, child mortality is still much higher 
in Brazil than in high-income countries. Under-5 mortality in Brazil was at 
17.5 deaths per 1000 live births in 2009 (Rasella et al., 2013). This is 
slightly higher than Argentina’s rate of 15, but lower than Colombia’s rate of 
19 or Paraguay’s at 24. A number of those deaths occurred from easily 
treatable, poverty related causes, such as diarrheal diseases, malnutrition and 
lower respiratory infections.  
The human costs of child mortality are devastating, but difficult to 
quantify. It is easier to study the effects of childhood health. Research has 
uncovered consistent evidence that anemia and parasitic infections affect 
cognitive achievement (Behrman, 1996). Another study found that a dollar 
invested in childhood nutrition in a developing country would likely return 
at least three dollars’ worth of gains in academic achievement (Glewwe, 
Jacoby & King, 2001). Children who receive adequate nutrition are taller, 
enter school earlier and achieve academic advancements faster (Alderman, 
Hoddinott & Kinsey, 2006). Bolsa Família’s design tries to address the 
effect that health has on educational achievement and child mortality 
through its mandatory medical visits. The evidence indicates that these 
interventions are successful, increasing the use of preventive services and 
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reducing under-5 mortality (Lagarde, Haines & Palmer, 2007; Rasella et al., 
2013).  
The question that remains, however, is whether these short-term changes 
in child health translate into long-term effects. If children are generally 
healthier, this should contribute to greater academic success, as mentioned 
above, but should manifest in other facets of society as well. For example, 
we might observe a decrease in infant mortality in the short term since 
healthier mothers should have healthier pregnancies and healthier babies 
(Alderman et al., 2006). Also, as those young girls grow up with better 
nutrition and begin to bear children of their own, their improved health and 
education should lead to additional reductions in infant and child mortality 




As addressed in the introduction, Bolsa Família has had significant, 
measurable, short-term impacts on both health outcomes and school 
enrollment. This paper will be tracking those impacts as the program 
approaches its twentieth year.  In analyzing long-term impacts, one might 
also expect to see changes in employment patterns as some of the first child 
beneficiaries of the program are now in the 18-24 year old demographic 
range. All three of these components; health, education, and employment are 
measurable independently but in reality they are inherently intertwined. 
One of the first initiatives of the Bolsa program was immediate poverty 
alleviation in the form of cash transfers to parents in conjunction with 
regular medical checkups in order to ensure that child beneficiaries were 
receiving adequate nutrition. It has long been known that a nutritious diet is 
critical for optimal brain development and function, and that the timing of 
nutrient supplementation or deprivation also matters (Bryan et al., 2004). 
Since the program requires that children display healthy growth trajectories, 
parents have large incentives to ensure that children receive adequate 
nutrition. In addition to relieving a portion of human suffering, one could 
expect to see the impacts of better nutrition manifest other ways. For 
example, it may contribute to academic achievement, since those children 
will be better able to learn in school.  
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The school attendance requirements will also likely contribute to better 
academic achievement. The structure of Bolsa Família assumes that the poor 
are capable of- and motivated to address their short-term needs. The pinch of 
poverty has taught them to manage their resources carefully (Collins, 
Morduch, Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2009). Indeed, evidence consistently 
shows that cash transfer programs increase consumption in most cases, 
reducing both poverty headcount and the poverty gap (Fiszbein & Schady, 
2009). However, the structure of CCTs also assumes that poor families are 
not always good at investing in the future. It may be a result of ignorance of 
the return an investment may yield in the future, or simply because the ache 
of hunger compels them to focus on present consumption to the exclusion of 
future considerations. The requirements, or conditions, that potential 
beneficiaries must meet in order to receive assistance forces them to make 
human capital investments that are expected to give children a better chance 
at climbing out of the mud pit of poverty.  
For example, a person’s level of education has a significant impact on her 
future income (Sandoval, 2012). Unfortunately, poor students are likely to 
spend less time in school than their middle- and upper class counterparts 
(Schwartzman, 2005). In an attempt to address the short-fall in education for 
the poor, Bolsa Família requires that children of beneficiary families attend 
school at least 85% of the time. So if children miss school too often, or if 
adolescent children drop out of school, the family no longer receives benefits 
for that child. This means that parents are given a significant incentive to 
ensure that children are attending, as well as an effective means of 
monitoring their children’s attendance. Unsurprisingly, much evidence 
shows that enrollment has increased as a result (Glewwe & Kassouf, 2012). 
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the increase in enrollment has had any real 
impact on educational achievement according to test scores. Some studies 
find that it has a significant effect on graduation (Baird, McIntosh & Özler, 
2011), while others do not (Baird, Ferreira & Özler, 2013). This may be a 
result of the program design, which requires enrollment and attendance, but, 
unlike programs in several other countries, Bolsa Família does not require 
grade promotion or graduation.  
On the other hand, the enrollment requirement may change the culture 
surrounding education in Brazil. Since children are spending more time in 
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school than they did in the past, and they know that there are financial 
rewards for doing so, they be more likely to dedicate themselves to academic 
success. School attendance is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition 
for grade promotion. Without Bolsa Família, a certain cohort of children 
would drop out of school. However, the cash transfer, which is conditional 
on their attendance, provides a large enough incentive to keep them in 
school. Since the cash incentive persists until they are 18 years old, younger 
children know that they are likely to remain in school at least until they turn 
18. The benefit of an education resembles a step-wise function rather than a 
curve. An average person’s income is unlikely to be affected much by an 
additional year of schooling, unless that additional year results in graduation. 
In that case, the individual’s likely income will jump significantly. 
Therefore, enrollment is a necessary condition, but graduation is a sufficient 
condition for gaining the financial return that education provides.  
Imagine a scenario with two children, one who is a Bolsa Família 
recipient, and an identical child who is not. For the recipient child, call her 
A, she knows that, because of the conditionality of the cash transfer, she is 
likely to remain in school at least until she turns 18. It would not make 
financial sense for her to drop out. Child B, on the other hand, the child who 
is not a recipient of the Bolsa Família program, has no additional incentive 
to remain in school. Since child B knows that there is some chance that he 
will drop out of school before he has time to reach graduation, he is less 
motivated to achieve academic success, because the financial payoff from 
academic success is only unlocked upon graduation. Therefore, the 
probability of dropping out discounts the expected financial reward from 
academic success. Child A, however, knowing that she will remain in school 
until she turns 18 sees that she could be very close to unlocking the financial 
reward associated with graduation by the time she ages out of the program, if 
she applies herself to her studies.  
In the short term, children whose families enter the program when they 
are already well into their education may already be far enough behind that 
they will not be very close to graduation by the time they age out of the 
program. Therefore, they have no additional incentive to work for academic 
success. As time passes, however, and children enter their first year of 
school with the expectation of remaining in school at least until they turn 18 
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because financial rewards for doing so are large enough to offset the rewards 
of dropping out. Consequently, they know that they can be very close to 
graduation by the time they age out of the program. So the program offsets 
the rewards of dropping out for long enough that graduation is within reach. 
The real impact of Bolsa Família on graduation rates may take several years 
to manifest. It might take 8-10 years before children enter the program at a 
young enough age to be influenced by the change in their incentives that 
Bolsa Família creates, and perhaps longer if students and families are slow 
to adjust to the new incentive structure. 
 H1: Bolsa Família should improve academic achievement outcomes 
In addition to nutritional requirements for children, the program also 
offers benefits to pregnant and lactating mothers who are also required to 
show indications of adequate nutrition. It is expected that as the child 
beneficiaries are consuming a more nutritious diet due to cash transfers, 
expectant and lactating mothers, who are also direct beneficiaries of the 
program, will be doing the same.  As a result, after Bolsa’s initial impact, 
proponents expect to see a continued drop in the rate of stillbirths and infant 
mortality over the long-term with Brazil’s Bolsa Família playing a major 
role in the outcome (Adato, Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2016; Baird, 
Chirwa, Mcintosh & Ozler, 2010). Mexico’s Progresa conditional cash 
transfer program has been attributed to a 17% decline in rural infant 
mortality and in some cases neonatal mortality rates (Barham, 2011). 
Bolsa Família’s nutrition initiatives should also have an effect on 
mothers. Since an unsuccessful pregnancy may lead to a family choosing to 
attempt pregnancy multiple times, lower infant mortality and birth rates 
should reduce the amount of time women are pregnant. More successful 
births and better infant health will lead to lower birth rates due to fewer 
pregnancies (Schellekens & van Poppel, 2012; Scrimshaw, 1978). This will 
benefit maternal health, and the amount of time and energy mothers are able 
to dedicate to their surviving children, but it may also lead to more 
participation in the workforce. Lower infant mortality rates should also lead 
to better mental health in that it is less likely a family will have to deal with 
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the loss of a child. This allots mothers more free time that may, without the 
program, have been spent strictly on childbearing and health maintenance.   
Nutrition is monitored, somewhat crudely, through the required regular 
medical checkups for pregnant or lactating mothers and children of 
beneficiary families. Evidence suggests that conditional cash transfer 
programs are effective in increasing the use of preventative services and, in 
some cases, improves health status (Lagarde et al., 2007).  Long-term health 
impacts of Bolsa Família due to nutritional supplements and preventative 
measures should be attributable to increased health and health awareness 
among the beneficiaries.  A healthy child is less likely to be impaired by 
cognitive or physical setbacks that may result from malnutrition or 
preventable disease, which will make it easier for her to transition into 
school and be better equipped to gain an education.  
School enrollment and a higher level of grade completion are both goals 
of the Bolsa program.  One of the conditions of Bolsa Família is that all 
children of beneficiary families between the ages of 6 and 15 must be 
enrolled in school and attend 85% of the time (Glewwe & Kassouf, 2012).  
Some results from BF indicated that a larger number of children were 
enrolling in schools. This enrollment however, did not translate into a higher 
grade level completion rate according to some studies (Baird et al., 2010, 
2013). More positive results in this study regarding grade level completion 
due to the spillover effect of better nutrition and cognitive development as a 
generation of students who has consistently received adequate nutrition and 
medical attention progresses through the school system are expected as well.  
While the original goal was to encourage children to complete 8 years of 
school, it is anticipated that those who do will also be encouraged to attend 
secondary school and possibly even pursue a higher education.  
Given that teenagers and young adults attend secondary school at higher 
rates, one might expect this trend to translate into lower birth rates among 
teenage girls in Brazil. Young girls will have financial incentives to remain 
in school, which is more difficult for teen mothers (Baird et al., 2013). 
Moreover, additional education tends to lead to delayed pregnancy (Duflo, 
Dupas, Kremer & Sinei, 2006). Results from different CCT’s around the 
world that focus on higher levels of education have all yielded significant 
declines in the rate of teenage pregnancy for females who are beneficiaries 
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of the programs due to sexual education, contraception awareness and 
dispersal, and family planning education.  In Malawi, early marriage, 
teenage pregnancy and reported sexual activity among teenagers all dropped 
between 30-40% due to the Zomba Cash Transfer Program (Baird et al., 
2010).  An exception is Mexico’s Oportunidades where studies show that the 
number of adolescent and young women reporting ever being pregnant 
remained flat at 33-36%, though the use of contraception has been rising 
steadily (Darney et al., 2013).  
 H2: Bolsa Família should lead to a reduction in fecundity rates 
With fewer children working and more children completing higher levels 
of education we should begin to see a direct effect on the job market in 
Brazil. One study shows that Bolsa initially had a positive effect on the adult 
labor force with the greatest impact being on women in the work force.  It 
must also be noted that CCTs do not appear to lead people to exit the 
workforce as some have contended (Soares, Ribas & Osório, 2010). The 
logical extension of previous research into this area would suggest that the 
child beneficiaries of the Bolsa program, once adults, will have a lower rate 
of unemployment than those in their age range at the beginning of the 
program. In the long-term, more education should translate into easier 
attainment of skilled jobs in the formal job market along with the desire of 
the newly educated young adults to take the skills they have acquired to the 
job market. There should be a new generation of job-seekers and 
entrepreneurs who are better positioned to raise their standard of living 
beyond that of their less educated parents. All else being equal, formal 
economy work is generally more reliable and offers better pay and benefits 
than informal work (Banerjee & Duflo, 2012). The long-term result is that 
formal economy workers face far fewer of the uncertainties and disruptions 
that tend to plague informal work, which means more consistent 
consumption patterns. 
 H3: Bolsa Família should lead to a reduction in formal economy 
unemployment 
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All three of these factors, child health, education and employment are 
reliant on one another. Cognitive and physical development will make it 
easier for a child to perform well in school. School performance should 
result in greater skills, sense of opportunity, and recognition of an 
individual’s ability to raise their standard of living. This realization that one 
can raise their standard of living should directly affect participation in the 
job market.   
It is this new generation of skilled laborers that should be the key to 
eradicating inter-generational poverty. This is due to an influx of human 
capital as provided by Bolsa that begins with the health of the beneficiaries 
when they are infants and maintains these benefits through school and far 
beyond the program’s requirements. Proponents expect to see positive 
changes in most of the societal conditions that Bolsa Família originally 
intended to combat due to changes in health, education standards, gender 
roles, and human capital.  
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Relationships 
 
So, as Figure 1 demonstrates, without CCTs, we often see poverty 
begetting poverty. Children of poor households are likely to grow up and 
head poor households of their own. This article is examining whether CCTs 
can disrupt the intergenerational poverty cycle, as purported by proponents. 
The next section describes the empirical tests of the hypotheses. 




The empirical analysis uses data provided by two Brazilian government 
agencies, the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social and the Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísticas. It tests whether there is evidence of 
significant change in 8th grade graduation, unemployment figures, child 
labor and fertility rates during the first decade of the Bolsa Família program. 
If Bolsa Família is accomplishing its secondary objective, to break inter-
generational poverty cycles, we should be able to see more change in key 
indicators for municipalities that had higher implementation than those 
municipalities that had low implementation. The key explanatory variable 
and the dependent variables are endogenous. Therefore, it is necessary to 
instrument for the key explanatory variable Avg Bolsa Families, or the 
average number of Bolsa recipient families in each municipality over the 
years 2003-2010.  
Since Bolsa Família, the key explanatory variable, is designed to target 
the poor, and the dependent variables are all closely related to poverty, there 
is a problem with endogeneity. Using 2SLS, Bolsa Coverage, or the 
proportion of people who actually received cash transfers compared to the 
number the government expected based on official municipal statistics, was 
one of the instruments. The other instrument was Average Population in the 
municipality. Statistical tests confirmed that the models were endogenous 
without instrumenting and that instrumenting solved the endogeneity 
problem. 
The regression analysis shows that Bolsa Família has a significant impact 
on 8th grade graduation. 8th grade graduation rates were going up all over 
Brazil, and much of Latin American and the developing world in general 
during this time period, but municipalities that had more families who were 
recipients of cash transfers had unexpectedly large gains in 8th grade 
graduation. Despite school attendance being one of the key conditions for 
the program, some previous studies have found mixed evidence on actual 
graduation rates (Bursztyn & Coffman, 2012; Saavedra & Garcia, 2013). So 
a statistically significant result here is meaningful. The substantive impact, 
shown in Figure 1, is noteworthy too. Increasing Bolsa recipient families by 
ten per thousand population increases 8th grade graduation by a predicted 
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2%. This result should be encouraging for CCT proponents, considering 
some previous studies have found no impact at all. On the other hand, Bolsa 
Família is not going to single-handedly spike educational outcomes across 
Brazil. 
Table 1.   
Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2000-2010 Change In 
     
 8th grade graduation rate 53716 0.481 0.130 0.032 0.855 
 Unemployment rate 60247 3.995 5.004 -32.47 42.31 
 Fertility rate 60489 0.016 0.013 -0.049 0.151 
 Avg Family recipients/1000 pop 38908 76.516 39.400 2.195 217.425 
 GMP (gross municipal product) 33331 0.034 0.400 0.001 38.499 
 100k births 2000 60489 0.270 1.369 0.007 74.042 
 Fertility rate 2000 60489 0.050 0.017 0.002 0.173 
 Avg Population 61127 33879.25 200512.5 819 1.11E+07 
 Urban 61138 1.577 1.170 0 4 
 Bolsa Coverage 61055 97.652 30.206 0.22 727.59 
 
Many experts and policy makers involved with CCTs would argue that 
educational achievement is really just a means to an end. The program was 
not designed to improve educational outcomes, but to alleviate poverty in the 
short term and to break the inter-generational poverty cycle in the long-term. 
One concern that some have expressed, however, is that when poor families 
receive cash transfers they will work less (Foguel & Barros, 2010). Table 2 
shows a very different conclusion. Instead, the more families who receive 
cash transfers in a municipality, the lower the unemployment rate is. In fact, 
unemployment displays the greatest sensitivity to the proportion of Bolsa 
recipient families in a municipality. Adding ten more recipient families per 
thousand population reduces unemployment by an estimated 1.8%.  
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Table 2.   
Long-term Effects of Bolsa Família 
 
 Graduation Unemployment Fertility 
Recipient families/1000 pop. 
0.0119*** -0.181*** -0.000449*** 
(0.00205) (0.0440) (0.000117) 
GMP 0.0171 0.463* -0.000699 
 (0.0104) (0.233) (0.000553) 
Regions 0.176*** 2.825*** -0.00678** 
 (0.0389) (0.843) (0.00219) 
Urban 0.0898*** 0.688 -0.00485*** 
 (0.0200) (0.444) (0.00118) 
Fertility rate   0.684*** 
   (0.0168) 
Constant -0.928*** -24.60*** 0.0375* 
 (0.266) (5.758) (0.0147) 
N 4890 5485 5507 
chi2 456.1 333.5 2757.3 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; GMP and 
Coverage are for 2009; Recipient Families is instrumented with Avg Population and 
Coverage 
It should be noted that these are official unemployment figures, and there 
may be other factors that are hiding part of the relationships. For example, 
the informal market is robust in much of Brazil and unemployment figures 
only count people who are actively looking for work in the formal market 
(Bosch, Goni & Maloney, 2007). With the figures on greater educational 
attainment, however, it seems more likely that people are finding jobs in the 
formal market than in the less efficient, lower paying and riskier informal 
market. There are other factors that the literature has identified that might 
have some impact on the relationships in question here, such as 
electrification, particularly rural electrification (Pereira, Freitas & da Silva, 
2010), the depth of individual poverty (Cardoso & Verner, 2006), or the 
structure of industry in an area (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2007; 
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Bittencourt, 2010). However, due to data constraints some of those factors 
cannot be fully accounted for. Because this analysis uses municipal level 
data, precise indicators for those factors are not available. On the other hand, 
the control variables included in the models displayed in Table 2 pick up a 
good deal of that noise, even if in a relatively rudimentary manner. Industry 
tends to cluster by regions in Brazil, with large scale agriculture 
concentrated in the central-west and south, or finance concentrated in the 
south-east. Urban and GMP also help account for some of this statistical 
noise. The results of more comprehensive regressions are displayed in the 
appendix. CCTs are, of course, not the only factor that affects poverty. 
Political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), trade (Harrison, 
Rutherford, Tarr & Gurgel, 2004), economic growth (Ferreira, Leite & 
Ravallion, 2010), foreign direct investment (Bonelli, 1999), and a variety of 
other factors can affect poverty alleviation. However, because this analysis 
focuses exclusively on Brazil, these variables remain consistent.  
Figure 2.  Fitted Line Graphs with 95% Confidence Intervals 
Fertility is used as an instrument for social changes such as female 
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short term. The average fertility rate actually grew by .016 nationwide from 
2000-2010. Bolsa Família slowed, and even reversed the national trend in 
increasing fertility rates. Using the same variation in Bolsa Família as before 
results in a 0.004 decline in poverty. So, adding 40 families per thousand 
population would reverse the national trend of increasing fertility rates. 
Nominally, this seems like a small change, but because fertility rates tend to 
be sticky, this means that we see some of the greatest gains, relative to 
random variation, from Bolsa Família in fertility rates, second only to 
unemployment. The gains in fertility rates should be viewed remembering 
that the program targets women in particular. Women are generally the 
registered recipients of the cash transfers. This likely gives them more 
influence in financial decision making in the household and provides them 
with a freer hand to use the money as they see fit. This female empowerment 
may be spilling over into young women who are choosing to exercise more 
control over family planning and implement more conservative family sizes. 
This may also be directly related to the finding of reduced unemployment. 
Women may be working more and, therefore, wish to limit their number of 
children. 
As a robustness check, data was coded from Brazil’s Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografía e Estatística which conducts regular National Household 
Surveys. This is a useful check because the data is available at the individual 
level, rather than the municipal level. To determine whether a household is a 
Bolsa Família recipient, we relied on a coding scheme developed by 
previous researchers (Foguel & Barros, 2010). Their method is quite reliable 
when compared to surveys that included questions about the program. As 
this is a rather comprehensive survey, it was not difficult to find questions 
that matched the hypotheses. In order to compare like cases, the following 
analysis only compares recipient households to non-recipient households 
that had an income of no more than $R3000 per month, which approximates 
the peak income of recipient households. Admittedly, this does not account 
for family size or cost of living, but it does narrow the analysis to 
households living in approximately the same sociodemographic space, and, 
likely, the same neighborhoods.  
 





Table 3.   
PNAD Robustness Check 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Highest grade Work permit Children total 
Cash Transfer 0.000518*** 0.000131*** -0.0000549*** 
 (0.0000152) (0.0000191) (0.00000915) 
Age -0.0443*** -0.00365*** -0.0200*** 
 (0.000373) (0.000323) (0.000216) 
Sex -0.145*** -0.103*** . 
female = 1 (0.0212) (0.0137) . 
Year -0.00683*** -0.00562*** -0.0185*** 
 (0.00203) (0.00169) (0.00124) 
constant 18.81*** 11.95*** 39.57*** 
 (4.070) (3.385) (2.487) 
N 95319 10851 95111 
R2 0.138 0.023 0.088 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The results are similar except that the statistical relationships are 
stronger. In Table 3, the size of the cash transfer has a statistically significant 
impact on the outcome variable. Results are robust to various model 
specifications and error term structures. A person living in a household that 
receives the average stipend of R$152 per month is predicted to progress 
nearly a full grade level higher than a similar person whose household is not 
a program recipient. Likewise, an adult is 24% more likely to have a signed 
work card, an indication of formal economy employment. Finally, the same 
person is expected to have fewer children, though the substantive impact 
here is nearly zero. The model predicts a decrease of less than one child per 









The theory predicted that Bolsa Família would yield long-term benefits to 
recipient families. Indeed, the objective of the program is to go beyond 
simply addressing short-term poverty alleviation and break inter-
generational poverty cycles. If the program is effective, we should be able to 
see some of these effects manifesting at the societal level as program 
recipients have been incentivized to seek more healthcare and education. 
Societal level influences should manifest themselves through higher school 
completion rates because children are required to attend school in order to 
receive benefits. Likewise, we should observe lower child labor since 
children would be spending more time in school and families would have 
less need of supplementary income after receiving cash transfers. Additional 
education would help lower unemployment once those recipients entered the 
labor market because having more education makes them more competitive 
for formal market employment. Finally, observation should indicated lower 
birth rates because women will receive more healthcare and health 
information, and since women have more education they are therefore more 
likely to secure gainful employment, and the opportunity cost of having 
more children would be greater. 
Using information from the Bolsa Família program on the number of 
families who received cash transfers in each municipality and comparing 
against census data, this study finds that Bolsa Família indeed has long-term 
societal-level impacts. It uses a two-stage least squares regression to analyze 
the data and find statistically significant relationships for 8th grade 
graduation, unemployment, child labor and fertility rates. Though the 
substantive impacts varied, they were all large enough to be meaningful in 
the national context. It seems likely that these trends will continue into the 
future and that additional research will verify these findings. 
Perhaps the key contribution of this research is to validate conditional 
cash transfer programs’ two-pronged approach to poverty alleviation. Well-
respected research has verified for several years now that CCTs have a 
significant short-term impact on poverty and now this analysis has found 
evidence that the programs appear to be breaking down the inter-
generational poverty cycle, something that very few social welfare programs 
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have accomplished. This also means that the return on investment in CCTs is 
larger, and perhaps more diverse, than can be detected in the short-term. 
Bolsa Família appears to be changing the texture of the social fabric by 
slowly wiping away inter-generational poverty.  
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